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This lecture revisits the evidence on the incidence and severity of different varieties of financial crises
within the context of globalization then ( pre-1914) and now ( 1980 to the present). I then discuss the
determinants of emerging market crises from the perspective of the recent balance sheet approach.
This approach puts at center stage the importance of financial development. I then peel the onion back
further and consider the "deep" institutional determinants of financial development and their relationship
to financial stability. I conclude by conjecturing about the ways countries learn from their financial













  Financial crises are an old problem. They go back to the origins of capitalism and 
beyond. Kindleberger’s ( 2000) Manias, Crashes and Panics , describes crises as far back as 
the seventeenth century and earlier. The topic of financial crises is an important issue for 
today’s emerging market economies in the current era of globalization. It was a similar issue 
in the earlier era of globalization from 1870-1914. However the incidence and virulence of 
crises was much less in the earlier era for the emerging countries than is the case today.  
 
  Advanced countries in recent years have experienced few crises, but they experienced 
many more in their course of economic development, when they were emerging market 
economies. Also , of course, during the interwar period and again in the 1970s/80s/and 
early 90s, advanced countries experienced both currency and banking crises.  
  
  What explains the incidence and virulence of financial crises? How do financial 
crises relate to the general process of financial development and even more to the general 
process of economic growth? Are crises a necessary part of the development process like 
teenagers and car accidents? How do countries grow up to financial stability , i.e develop the 
sound institutions and policies so that they can prevent, contain( manage) and resolve 
financial crises? What is the role of institutions ( both political and economic ) in creating an 
environment for financial stability? 
 
  This lecture briefly revisits the evidence on the incidence and severity of different 
varieties of crises within the context of globalization then ( pre 1914) and now ( 1980 to the 
present), in my earlier work with Barry Eichengreen  and in my recent work with Chris 
Meissner. I then discuss the determinants of emerging market crises from the perspective of 
the recent balance sheet approach to financial crises which builds on the earlier literatures of 
banking crises, debt crises, and first and second generation currency crises. This approach 
puts at center stage the importance of financial development. I then peel the onion back 
further and consider the “deep” institutional determinants of financial development and their 
relation to financial stability. I conclude with some lessons from history. 
 
 
  2. A Brief Review of the Evidence on Financial Crises. 
 
  Before revisiting the empirical evidence on financial crises, let me briefly define my 
terms. Financial crises encompass banking, currency and debt crises and combinations of the 
three. Banking crises include both banking panics involving a scramble by the public for 
means of payment which, unless prevented by a lender of last resort leads to monetary 
collapse and recession, and a more recent variant ,an insolvency crisis in an environment 
characterized by the presence of a financial safety net ( explicit or implicit deposit insurance 
and fiscal bailouts). In our empirical work  we identify banking crises as periods  of severe 
difficulty in the banking sector when a large proportion of the banking sector’s capital is 
eroded. A currency crisis is a market based attack on the exchange value of a currency. In 
our empirical work we identify currency  crises  as a period when there was  a forced 
abandonment of an exchange rate commitment or a large change in the value of the 
exchange rate within a given year. In  twin crises, both currency and banking crises occur 
together. Debt crises are defined as a situation where a debtor is unable to service the interest 
and or principal as scheduled, hence impairing the financial health of the lender. Debt crises   3 
include both defaults and repudiations. Finally a third generation crisis is defined as a twin 
crisis accompanied by a debt default. 
 
  Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez Peria ( 2001) provide evidence for a 
panel of 21 countries for 120 years ( 1880-1997) on the frequency and severity of currency, 
banking and twin crises.. 
 
  Figure 1 shows the frequency of crises, where we divide the number of crises by the 
number of crisis year observations. We demarcate the data into four eras : the pre 1914 era of 
globalization ( 1880-1913); the interwar ( 1919-1939); the Bretton Woods era ( 1945-1971); 
and the recent era ( 1973-1997). As can be seen crises appear to be growing more frequent. 
Crisis frequency of 12.2 % since 1973 exceeds  even the unstable interwar period and is now 
three times as great as the pre-1914 earlier era of globalization. Moreover a comparison of 
crisis frequency between emerging and advanced countries in figure 2 suggests that with the 
exception of the interwar, the majority of  crises occurred in the emerging countries. 
 
  Bordo and Meissner ( 2006)  expand the Bordo et al (2001) data base by adding in 9 
more emerging countries to the pre 1914 sample and include debt and third generation crises. 
See figure 3. For the pre 1914 period we see the pattern in Bordo et al ( 2001),the 
predominant form of crisis before 1914 were banking crises, followed by currency crises, 
twin crises and then debt crises. The most recent peiod seems much more crisis prone in 
virtually all dimensions. 
 
  Finally, Bordo et al ( 2001) presented evidence on the output losses from crises. We 
calculated , over the years prior to full recovery, the difference  between pre- crisis trend 
growth and actual growth. See figure 4. we found that output losses from currency crises 
were even greater before 1914 than today. The difference is most pronounced for emerging 
countries . Output losses from banking crises were also greater in the pre- 1914 regime than 
today. Twin crises are comparable  across the two eras of globalization. The key 
unsurprising fact we found was the large output loss from both currency and twin crises in 






3. Emerging Market country Crises Versus Advanced country  Crises. 
 
 
The advanced countries of western Europe : Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Switzerland learned to deal with crises by the eve of World War I. They had 
developed a sound institutional framework and learned to follow successful policies within 
that framework. The framework included sound fiscal institutions (efficient tax systems, 
balanced budgets, low debt ratios); sound monetary institutions ( a nationwide banking 
system, a central bank which could act as a lender of last resort, and credible adherence to 
the classical gold standard). By pegging the values of their national currencies to a fixed 
price( weight) of gold, they adopted the gold standard rule which committed them to 
maintain gold convertibility except in the case of exceptional circumstances like wars ( 
Bordo and Kydland 1995). This in turn meant that they would follow the time consistent 
policies of balanced budgets and monetary policy targeting the fixed parity. They also had 
developed financial markets ( which largely overcame the problems of asymmetric   4 
information) and which allowed market participants ( at home and from abroad) to 
efficiently channel their saving into productive investment. 
 
 These institutions and policies were embedded in an overarching framework of free trade, 
free capital and labor movements ( “the liberal order”) in an era of relative political stability 
which was free  from major wars. Some attribute this state of affairs to the “ Pax Brittanica” , 
others to a finely tuned balance of power between Britain, France, Germany, Austria 
Hungary, Russia, Turkey and the United States. As we discuss below, behind this 
framework for the advanced countries lay the deep fundamentals of the rule of law, secure 
property rights ( ie a legal system to protect them ), and constitutional democracy. 
 
By contrast, many of the emerging countries of the era, especially those in the peripheral 
areas of Southern Europe, Latin America and Asia, faced a more turbulent financial 
environment. These countries were in the process of developing fiscal and monetary 
institutions or adapting the institutions which they inherited from their mother countries in 
Europe ( Bordo and Cortes Conde 2001) as well  as the accompanying policies . They were 
more prone to the incidence of financial crises. 
 
  The forty years before World War I, ‘ the golden age of financial globalization” were 
characterized by unprecedented massive capital flows of financial capital from the Old world 
to the New world ( net capital flows on average were between 3-5% of GDP in a number of 
countries for many years),   Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). These  were attracted by the higher 
returns  from abundant land and resources. 
 
 
  These inflows on occasion, led to lending booms, especially in land , where prices 
were bid up above fundamental values, followed by busts ( eg Argentina 1889, Australia 
1893). The boom –busts often triggered banking panics in an environment without a central 
bank or any other effective lender of last resort. Booms were also often accompanied by 
fiscal expansion , financed by money creation, and by government  debt accumulation. The 
resultant inflationary pressure often led to speculative attacks on the currencies  of countries 
attempting to emulate and to attract capital from the advanced countries by pegging their 
currencies to gold. In other words they attempted to adopt the gold standard as a ‘ good 
housekeeping seal of approval’ (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). In addition, many emerging  
countries were prone to debt crises when their economies collapsed consequent upon a 
lending bust and banking crisis. Often they were unable to raise sufficient tax revenues to 
service the debt with their inefficient procyclical tax regimes based on indirect excise taxes 
and customs duties. 
 
In addition , all emerging countries had ‘ original sin” Eichengreen and Hausmann’s ( 1999) 
term for the inability to borrow abroad ( or even at home) in terms of their own currencies. 
This was manifest in debt requiring gold or exchange rate clauses. This meant that when 
their currencies crashed that the real burden of their debt servicing denominated in gold or 
hard currency soared, in turn increasing the likelihood of a government debt default and 
insolvency by private firms. This type of crisis, referred to as a “third generation crisis’ or a“ 
balance sheet crisis was at the heart of the Asian crisis of 1997 ( Mishkin 2006). It was also 
an important part of the story in the pre 1914 era of globalization according to Bordo and 
Meissner ( 2006). 
 
Finally, an important precipitating factor in emerging market crises both then  and now were 
“ sudden stops “, when circumstances in the advanced  lending countries (such as a rise in   5 
the Bank of England’s Bank rate  in reaction to a decline in its gold reserves reflecting large 
capital outflows to the new world) would lead to a cut off of capital flows to the emerging 
countries, producing a massive current account reversal and contraction of domestic 
aggregate demand ( a compression of consumption to generate the domestic saving needed 
to replace the lost foreign inflows. This could trigger severe banking, currency and balance 
sheet crises leading to serious economic distress. See figure 5. 
 
Calvo et al ( 2004) view sudden stops ( combined with liability dollarization) as the key 
trigger of many financial crises in Latin America in recent decades. Bordo  ( 2006) and Catao 
( 2005) find a similar pattern for the emergers in the 1870s and 1890s. 
 
The pattern of emerging market crises in the first era of globalization just described was not 
universal. A number of countries, such as  Canada,  and the Scandanavian countries were 
able to avoid serious financial distress in the face of sudden stops in the pre 1914 era. 
Although these countries had original sin, they apparently had sufficiently sound fiscal and 
monetary institutions, what Caballero,  
 Cowen and Kearns (2004) refer to as “ country trust”, to avoid excessive debt exposure, to 
hold sufficiently large gold reserves to minimize currency mismatch between their local 
currency revenue streams and sterling liabilities, and to protect their banking systems from 
panics. As we discuss below this ability of some countries to withstand sudden stops may be 




4. Advanced Country Crises: The Interwar 
 
 
  The story we have told so far sees emerging market countries as prone to crises and 
the advanced countries as safe havens. That was generally the case before 1914 as it is today, 
but it was not the case in the interwar period which is of course “the mother of financial 
instability”. The advanced countries also suffered currency crises in the 1970s, 80s and early 
90s. 
 
  The interwar experience was largely an advanced country story. There has been 
considerable research on the financial instability of the interwar years and especially the 
Great Depression which I will only briefly discuss. The essence of the modern literature is 
that the Great Depression was  largely  a monetary phenomena with both domestic and 
international dimensions. Of most importance it reflected the severe policy mistakes by the 
newly formed Federal Reserve of killing the Wall Street boom in 1929, precipitating a 
serious recession and then not acting as a lender of last resort to stem a series of banking 
panics that followed. These actions were in turn a reflection of flaws in the design of the 
Federal  Reserve ( Friedman and Schwartz 1963), and in the monetary theory followed by 
Fed officials ( Meltzer 2003). 
 
  In addition, the monetary standard adhered to by the majority of countries, the gold 
exchange standard restored beginning in 1925, is viewed by many scholars as a key cause. 
According to Eichengreen ( 1992), Temin ( 1989), Bernanke and James ( 1991) and others, 
the decision after World War I by the belligerents to return to the gold standard without 
successfully dealing with the imbalances produced in their countries by  the war led to a 
series of fatal flaws ( maladjustment, insufficient liquidity, fragile confidence and lack of 
credibility), which eventually led to the collapse of the international monetary system in   6 
1931 and was either a crucial cause  or an extreme exacerbating force in the world wide 
depression which followed.  
 
   According to Eichengreen, once the depression started, gold standard adherents, 
lacking the credibility of the prewar to attract capital inflows in the face of a temporary 
current account deficit, were unable to follow the expansionary policies needed to reflate  
their economies and offset banking crises, because they  had ‘golden fetters”—if they 
followed such policies  they would be subject to a speculative attack forcing them off the gold 
standard. .Hence until they left the gold standard, they could not prevent deflation from 
taking its toll.  
 
  According to Friedman and Schwartz, the fixed exchange rates of the gold standard 
served to transmit the deflationary shocks coming from the collapse of the U.S. banking 
system and its economy, which the Fed failed to arrest, to the rest of the world. Thus unlike 
the case of the emergers, the crisis of the interwar did not reflect basic financial 
underdevelopment but largely egregious errors in policy and regime choice . 
 
 
  In reaction to the Great Depression, advanced countries imposed extensive controls 
on their financial sectors ( interest ceilings, firewalls between investment and commercial 
banking, reserve, capital and liquidity ratios). They also established a financial safety net of 
deposit insurance ( explicit and implicit)  lender of last resort policies. In the international 
economy, in reaction to the currency crises of the 1930s, the perception that floating rates 
were destabilizing, the perception that devaluations were beggar thy neighbour, the Bretton 
Woods Agreement of 1944 led to  an adjustable peg exchange rate system based on gold and 
the dollar and buttressed by capital controls. In sum, financial stability in the post war was 
ensured by financial repression. 
 
  As is well known, the Bretton Woods system was characterized by a series of 
currency crises reflecting misalignment between the currencies of member countries as well 
as a growing tension in many countries between internal and external balance with the 
growing emphasis on full employment. It also faced  a fundamental imbalance  because the 
center country, the U.S.,  followed inflationary policies in the late 1960s incompatible with 
its role as anchor of the dollar/gold exchange standard. Ultimately the Bretton Woods 
system collapsed by 1971 following a series of speculative attacks against U.S. gold reserves. 
Capital accounts were opened gradually and controls disappeared by the end of the 80s 
 
.The advanced countries ( with the principal exception of many European countries 
which formed the EMS and later EMU) adopted  managed floating rates in the 1970s and 
1980s. Like the gold standard pre 1914, managed floating exchange rates became the regime 
of choice ( Bordo and Flandreau 2003). It took decades of turmoil, extensive financial 
innovation and learning ( both in economic theory and practice) to operate a credible 
nominal anchor  based on low inflation and compatible with floating exchange rates. The 
nominal anchor of today’s central banks by anchoring inflation expectations  is similar in 
some respects  to the gold peg of pre 1914 ( Bordo and Schwartz 1999). With these 
developments, the currency crisis problem in the advanced countries ( with the principal 
exception of the EMS crisis in 1992) has greatly diminished.   
 
  Since the collapse of Bretton Woods, in the face of increased inflation in the 1970s, 
the extensive controls on the domestic financial sector were removed . In country after 
country, banking crises reappeared. A series of crises in the 1980s reflected the effects of   7 
disinflation on banks’ balance  sheets  and financial liberalization. In all these cases the 
banking system was protected by the safety net and by the degeneration of the principles of 
lender of last resort away from Bagehot’s strictures to lend freely at a penalty rate to solvent 
but illiquid banks, and towards the bailouts of “too big to fail”. Banking crises became 
solvency  crises , resolved by fiscal means. Since the early 90s, with the institution of better 
supervision and regulation based on market incentives and the return to price stability, 




5. Globalization, Crises, Financial Development and Growth. 
 
 
  Globalization, in the sense of the reduction of barriers to international trade is widely 
viewed as contributing to growth and welfare ( Bhagwati 2004). By contrast, financial 
globalization has a mixed press. In theory, opening up of the international capital markets 
should raise real growth because it produces a   better allocation of resources across countries 
and over time and it reduces risks by improved portfolio diversification. Also as is argued 
below, financial  openness combined with openness of trade should lead to financial 
development which in turn raises growth. 
 
  Yet the empirical evidence is mixed on this issue. Recent evidence from the IMF by 
Edison et al ( 2002) , Prasad et al ( 2006), Gourinchas and Jeanne ( 2006) all lead to the 
conclusion , based on data from the recent era of globalization, that international financial 
integration may not necessarily be associated with significantly higher growth. For the 
historical era of globalization, Schularick and Steger ( 2006) however do find evidence of a 
positive association between gross capital  flows from Britain and growth between 1880 and 
1913. they confirm the traditional view of Fishlow ( 1986), Foreman –Peck ( 1994) and 
Collins and Williamson ( 2001). Bordo and Meissner ( 2006) revisit this issue. Our empirical 
work suggests that when you condition standard growth regressions by the presence of 
financial crises, that the growth capital flows connection weakens considerably. Indeed it is 
only for the subperiod 1900 to 1913 that we find that controlling for crises, that opening up 
of international capital markets is good for growth. We also find some limited  evidence , for 
at least one country with sound financial institutions , Canada, that by avoiding financial 
crises its growth experience was strongly enhanced by financial openness. This research 
suggests an avenue for future research—to condition financial crises on measures of financial 
development. 
 
  A second strand of literature which argues quite convincingly from the data of the 
recent period that financial globalization on net balance is good for growth, despite the fact 
that it inevitably leads to financial crises, is by  Tornell and Westermann ( 2003). They 
provide evidence for a panel of emerging countries from 1980 to 2000, that both opening up 
international  trade and financial liberalization ( both doestic and international) increases 
growth. But financial liberalization by reducing borrowing constraints in the non traded 
goods sector, in an environment of imperfect contract enforcement, leads to an investment 
boom and then a bust. The bust episode is amplified because a collapse of the real exchange 
rate leads to a decline in net worth of firms with liability dollarization. However these boom-
bust episodes are rare events, measured by negative skewness in real credit growth. On 
balance the benefits of liberalization by reducing the constraints on collateral outweigh the 
costs of the occasional crisis. Thus countries like Thailand which open up and suffer the 
occasional crisis are better off than those which maintain capital controls like India.   8 
Supporting evidence that financial liberalization is good for growth despite the occasional 
crisis is provided by Demigurc-Kunt and Detriache ( 1998). 
 
  One question that arises from the Tornell-Westermann study is how do countries 
grow up so that they can benefit from foreign capital without suffering the pain?  Do they 
ever learn from their crisis  experience  or do they keep on banging their heads against the 
proverbial wall? How did today’s advanced countries that were yesterday’s emergers 
apparently learn from their experience? 
 
 
6.  Institutions, Financial Development and Crises: The Deep Fundamentals. 
 
 
  The remaining question is why are some emerging countries hardier than others and 
how do countries grow up to financial stability. An important answer is financial 
development and its deep institutional  determinants: the rule of law and protection of 






A.  Financial Revolutions and Growth 
 
 
  Extensive empirical research by King and Levine ( 1993) and others has established a 
strong connection between financial development proxied by the ratio of broad money to 
income and by various measures of stock market capitalization and future growth. Peter 
Rousseau and Richard Sylla   have built upon this with their concept of  “financial 
revolutions “. They argue , based on the history of the Netherlands, England,the U.S., 
France, Germany and Japan, that these countries grew rapidly after financial revolutions 
which created  ‘good’ financial systems. Such systems have five key components : sound 
public finances and public debt management; a stable monetary regime, a banking system, a 
central bank and well functioning securities markets ( Rousseau and Sylla 2003). 
 
  Each of the five countries studied went through a financial revolution that first led to 
the creation of sound public finances and a credible government debt market, which set the 
stage for the other elements to develop. The most famous case was the financial revolution in 
England following the Glorious Revolution in 1688 which gave Parliament control over 
public finances and ensured property rights. The English revolution followed that in the 
Netherlands earlier in the seventeenth century and built upon many of its innovations ( 
DeVries and Woude 1997). 
 
  The creation of a constitutional monarchy led to the creation of a long –term 
government bond market because lenders  were assured that  Parliament, representing the 
wealth holding citizens, would generate the taxes required to service the debt. This was aided 
by improvements in tax collection ( Dickson 1967) and the establishment of the Bank of 
England in 1694 as the government’s bank  to provide it with intermediate government 
finance. 
   9 
   Building upon these institutions, a nascent banking system and stock market quickly 
flourished. Based on these innovations, bond yields on government debt dropped 
dramatically and England was able to use bond finance to tax smooth and fight the wars 
which gave it global supremacy in the eighteenth century( Brewer 1974). The financial 
revolution led to the development of securities markets in England and the Netherlands and 




B.  Deeper Determinants of Financial Revolutions 
 
 
  Rousseau and Sylla’s concept of financial revolutions builds upon earlier work by 
Cameron ( 1967) and Goldsmith ( 1969) as well as on North and Weingast’s ( 1989) seminal 
article “ Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions governing Public 
choice in Seventeenth Century England “. North and Weingast view the constitutional 
monarchy that followed the Glorious Revolution as creating the secure property rights 
needed for the financial revolution. The institutional changes that occurred ( including the 
supremacy of Parliament, its exclusive authority to raise new taxes, the right to veto 
expenditures and audit the Crown, and the independence of the judiciary), by 
constitutionally enhancing the countervailing power of Parliament and the judiciary, ensured 
investors the credible commitment that the Crown would not attempt to expropriate  them  
and repeat the policies followed by earlier monarchs. Since Parliament was composed of the 
landed gentry, merchants and financiers , this meant that contracts would be more secure , 
giving investors the confidence to invest ( Rajan and Zingales 2003 p.137 ). 
 
  Rajan and Zingales ( 2003) peel back the onion of financial development a bit further 
than do North and Weingast. Focussing on the English case, they posit that the real 
breakthrough in the creation of secure property rights and enabling the power of Parliament, 
occurred in the reigns of the Tudors, Henry VII and Henry VIII. In his drive to secure his 
power, Henry VII eliminated the threats from the great nobles who had threatened the 
monarchy for centuries. Their lands were seized and sold on the open market. Henry VIII 
did the same to the monasteries. 
 
  According to Rajan and Zingales , these lands were purchased by yeomen farmers 
who had greater interest to put them to better use than the landlords or the church. The 
Tudors encouraged this class as allies against the nobles and the church. Moreover they 
realized that it was more in their  interest  to grant the gentry secure property rights to  their 
lands  and obtain steady tax revenue than to appropriate them in time of emergency. Further 
they argued, the members of the gentry used Parliament as a way to coordinate their 
common interest and power. 
 
  In addition, Rajan and Zingales dispute the view that the taming of the rapacious 
state by constitutional government is sufficient to achieve financial development. What 
blocks finance according to them is the power of wealthy incumbents who can control the 
government and keep out entrants. The incumbents according to them do not need access to 
external finance. Examples of this problem cited include the Haut Banque in early 
nineteenth century France, the Mexican banking system in the nineteenth century ( Haber 
1997), and the prohibition before the 1990s on interstate and branch banking in the U.S..  
However they posit that the power of the incumbency can be overcome by changes in 
political power, eg Napoleon’s conquest of Western Europe, by major technological change,   10 
eg the railroad which increased the size of the market and increased the need for external 
finance by the incumbents, and by external competition, especially via international trade 
combined with open capital markets. 
 
  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson ( 2004) go further. They see the deep 
determinants of economic institutions as coming from political power, which in turn 
depends on existing political institutions and the distribution of resources. However ,political 
institutions are endogenous, determined by political power and economic institutions. 
Following the theme developed by North and Weingast, they argue that the major changes 
in political institutions that occurred in England in the seventeenth century leading to the 
financial revolution , reflected the rise in the economic and ( de facto) political power of 
merchants who prospered from the opening up of the Atlantic trade. This group joined with 
the landed gentry ( as emphasized by Rajan and Zingales) to change political power and 
political institutions. According to them, the political revolution didn’t occur in 
Spain,Portugal and France because their political institutions were different. They were 
absolute monarchies who monopolized  international trade for fiscal ends. They differed 
from England ( and the Netherlands) where international trade was engaged in by 
individuals and small partnerships in a more competitive environment.  
 
  The heart of their story is the analysis of the evolution of economic institutions in the 
European colonies. According to them, areas which were hospitable to European settlers, 
those with sparse populations, abundant land and temperate climates ( eg  North America, 
Australasia, the southern cone of South America) , proxied by the disease environment in 
1600, ended up with institutions producing a fairly equitable distribution of property rights . 
The institutions in these areas fostered an environment favourable to investment and future 
economic growth. By contrast, areas which were hostile to European settlement  but had 
valuable resources to extract ( areas like India ,Africa , the West Indies and much of South 
America with tropical climates and dense indigenous populations), ended up  with 
institutions protecting property rights for the small minority of Europeans needed to extract 
the resources. The institutions which developed and persisted , concentrating wealth and 
power in a small elite, created an environment inimical to future economic growth. 
 
 
  A related explanation for the colonial experience of the Americas by Engerman and 
Sokoloff ( 2000), attributes institutional development to the inequality in wealth determined 
by initial factor endowments. Thus the greater concentration of land ownership in Latin 
America versus the U.S. and Canada explains their long-run institutional  trajectories ( 
North America with diffuse political power versus Latin America with power concentrated 
amongst elites), and the growing disparities in their levels of income. In terms of Rajan and 
Zingales approach, the incumbency blocking financial development would be stronger in 
Latin America than North America, as developed by Haber’s work ( 1997). 
 
  The articles in Bordo and Cortes- Conde (2001) trace the legacy of fiscal and 
monetary institutions from the mother countries of Western Europe to the countries of new 
settlement in the Americas. Like  Acemoglu et al, there is clear evidence that the fiscal 
institutions inherited from England, built upon the principles of representative democracy, 
differed markedly from those of Spain and Portugal.  
 The fiscal systems of the latter based on the transfer of royalties and excise tax revenues to 
the crown in Europe persisted after these countries became independent. The major 
difference was that the resources accrued to the local successors of the viceroyalties. 
   11 
Finally, the law and finance literature represented by La Porta et al ( 1997) asserts that a 
country’s legal origins is related to its willingness and ability to protect private property rights 
and to enforce private contracts, and these factors in turn increase the propensity of potential 
investors to hold financial assets. This literature contends that the common law tradition 







7.  Empirical Evidence on the Deeper Determinants of Financial Development and 
Financial Crises. 
 
  The literature on the institutional sources of financial development suggests a 
number of factors that may help explain successful financial development and the conditions 
conducive to financial stability. These include: from Rajan and Zingales, openness to trade 
and financial flows and major technological breakthroughs capable of breaking the power of 
the incumbency; from Acemoglu et al, settler mortality as a proxy for institutions protecting 
property rights, indicators of political institutions and the distribution of political power; 
from Engerman and Sokoloff,  measures of factor endowments; from Bordo and Cortes 
Conde, indicators of colonial legacy in fiscal ( and monetary)institutions; from the law and 
finance literature, indicators of legal origin. 
 
  There has  been some empirical research in economic history on the deeper 
institutional determinants of financial development and financial crises but there is definitely 
room for more. I will briefly describe a few efforts in this direction. 
 
  Rajan and Zingales ( 2003) present cross country panel evidence for 1913 showing 
that both openness to trade and open capital markets led to greater  financial development 
proxied by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. These results they argue reflect 
the effects of competition in reducing the power of the incumbency. 
 
  Acemoglu et al ( 2004) summarize the evidence from their research program. The 
incidence of settler mortality in 1600 is used as a proxy for the impact of institutions on 
growth. They find it to be well correlated with low enforcement of property rights (based on 
an index). They then use settler mortality as an instrument in cross country growth 
regressions. They find that most of the gap in per capita real income between rich and poor 
countries today can be explained by this proxy for economic institutions. 
 
  Bordo and Rousseau (2006) present evidence over the period 1880 to 1997 on the 
influence of legal origins ( English common law versus French civil law) on financial 
development measured by the ratio of broad money to GDP. Legal origins dummies were 
used by La Porta et al ( 1997) to explain  a considerable amount of cross country variation in 
financial development today. Our results show that civil law countries actually had better 
financial development than common law countries in the pre 1914 period. This may reflect 
the possibility that civil law procedures resolved contract disputes more rapidly than under 
English law. 
 
   Bordo and Rousseau ( 2006) also assessed whether political variables influenced 
financial development as suggested by Acemoglu et al. We found that Parliamentary systems   12 
as opposed to Presidential systems are related to higher levels of financial development. In 
addition we found that a measure of political instability, coups are negatively related to 
financial development. 
 
  Bordo and Oosterlinck ( 2005) focus on the determinants of debt defaults in the 1880-
1914 period, with emphasis on measures of political instability. The variable that comes in 
strongest for us is coups. We also found that debt defaults trigger political changes. 
 
  Finally, Bordo and Meissner ( 2006) study the institutional determinants of financial 
crises in the pre 1914 period. We found that emerging countries with original sin but with 
sound financial institutions are less prone to crises than countries with weaker institutions.     
 
   In sum, empirical evidence is suggestive of the importance of deep institutional 
fundamentals determining financial development in explaining the incidence of crises. More 
research is clearly needed to tie together the literature on the institutional determinants of 
growth with that on financial crises. 
 
 
8.  Conclusion; Some Lessons from History. 
 
 
  My foray into financial history emphasizes the importance of sound institutions as 
the bedrock of financial development, which in turn creates the conditions for financial 
stability. A number of questions and possible suggestions for future research emerge from my 
survey. 
 
   First, what is the role for learning—both institutional learning and learning to follow 
the policies consistent with the institutions? Do countries learn from their financial crises to 
improve their institutions and how do they do this?  
 
  Historical research suggests that learning did take place in the advanced countries. In 
the nineteenth century, the Bank of England learned to manage the banking crises that 
occurred every decade or so from 1825 to the Overend Gurney crisis of 1867. They adapted 
and innovated so that no true financial crises ever followed that event ( Schwartz 1983). 
They learned by managing successive crises and developing better techniques, such as the 
use of the Treasury Letter,  temporarily releasing the Bank from its gold constraint. They 
learned from pressure by periodic Parliamentary commissions that considered the renewal of 
the Bank’s charter,  and  above all from the writings of critics like Walter Bagehot. 
 
  In the United States, after the debacle of Andrew Jackson’s veto over the renewal of 
the charter of the Second Bank of the United States, banking panics followed with regularity 
until the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913. The advent of the National Banking 
system removed the threat of crises endemic to the Free banking era , coming from the  
difficulty in converting state bank notes into specie by creating a uniform safe national 
currency. The National Banking system  however, did not deal with the problem of mass 
attempts by the public to convert deposits into currency. This required the institution of a 
lender of last resort. The Federal Reserve, established for this very purpose, maintained 
stability for 15 years and then failed miserably in its task in the 1930s. The Fed has 
subsequently learned its lesson from that experience. The learning involved major changes in 
the structure of the Fed in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, concentrating its power in the 
Board in Washington. It also learned by having its power supplanted by the Treasury for   13 
over 25 years until the famous Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951. Finally, like the Bank of 
England after Bagehot, it learned from the critique of Friedman and Schwartz ( Bernanke 
2002). 
 
   One possible way that  financial crises can promote institutional learning is by going 
through a “cathartic crisis “ Bordo, James and Mody ( 2006). It occurs at a crucial point in a 
country’s economic and financial development when the forces of economic reform are 
pitted against  those of the incumbents. The crisis can tip the balance of power in favor of 
reform. Such conditions may have been present in the UK balance of payments crisis of 1976 
and in the Korean financial crisis of 1997. 
 
   These lessons of learning, as well as Tornell and Westermann’s evidence suggests 
that perhaps we should not be overly keen to make countries crisis proof before they are 
financially developed. In addition my survey suggests that more research is needed linking 
the deeper determinants of institutional change to financial development and to the 
conditions needed to grow up to financial stability. We need to better operationalize these 





























































































































































































































(average change in growth rates)
Notes: 
-Output loss = average growth rate three years before the crisis – average growth rate 3 years after the crisis 
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